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of neutrality in governmental
action toward religion by invalidating a statute designed to aid
a religious enclave. The decision signaled the Court's recog-

nition of the need to evolve from
the frequently criticized Lemon
test. By not developing aworkable standard, the Court left little guidance to legislatures and

lower courts in determining
whether a statute passes constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause.
- DavidA. Prichard

Ibanez v. Florida Dept
of Business and Professional Regulation, Bet of
Accountancy:

In Ibanez v. Florida
Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994), the United States Supreme Court reiterated the
heavy burden incumbent upon
state governments attempting
to censure or limit constitutionally protected commercial
speech when it considered the
disclosure of validly held designations of "Certified Public
Accountant" (CPA) and "Certified Financial Planner" (CFP),
by a person holding herself out
as an attorney, in advertising
and other communications with
the public. The Court held that
the State must demonstrate with
sufficient specificity, not mere
speculation or conjecture, that
the public would actually be
misled or harmed by the Petitioner's commercial speech, if
the State desires to restrict truthful commercial speech. The
State must also show that the
manner ofrestriction is no more
extensive than that which is necessary to serve the State's interest. In so holding, the Court
addressed whether the CFP designation is commonly recognized and, consequently, wheth-

er it would mislead a consumer
into thinking that a CFP is certified by the State.
The Petitioner, Silvia
Safille Ibanez, is a practicing
attorney in Winter Haven, Florida. In addition to being a member of the Florida Bar, Ibanez is
licensed by the Respondent,
Florida Board of Accountancy
(Board), as a CPA, and is authorized to use the designation
"Certified Financial Planner"
or "CFP" by a private organization known as the Certified
Financial Planner Board of Standards (CFPBS).
The gravamen of the
Board's complaint is that Ibanez
engaged in "false, deceptive,
and misleading" advertising
when she included her credentials as a CPA and a CFP in her
yellow pages listing, under the
"Attorneys" section, as well as
in her other communications
with the public. The Board
instituted an investigation, and
eventually a complaint against
Ibanez, after receiving an anonymous copy ofher yellow pages
listing. Pursuant to various sections of the Public Accountancy
Act, Board Rules, and the Florida Administrative Code, the
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Board charged that Ibanez practiced public accounting in an
unlicensed firm, that she used a
specialty designation that was
not approved by the Board
(CFP), and that she engaged in
"false, deceptive, and misleading" advertising by appending
the letters CPA to her name
thereby implying that she was
bound by the Public Accountancy Act.
During the subsequent
administrative hearing, the
Board dropped the allegation of
practicing public accounting in
an unlicensed firm and the Hearing Officer found in favor of
Ibanez on the remaining counts
for want of requisite proof.
Despite the Hearing Officer's
recommendation that the other
chargesbe dismissed, the Board,
in its Final Order of the Board of
Accountancy (May 12, 1992)
("Final Order"), declared
Ibanez guilty on both counts.
The District Court of Appeals
for the First District affirmed
the Board's decisionpercuriam,
upon Ibanez's appeal. Because
this action prohibited review by
the Florida Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.
After summarily concluding that the use of the CPA
and CFP designations was commercial speech for purposes of
the First Amendment, the Court
began its analysis by noting a
number of cases that have
stressed the burden carried by
the State when it attempts to
restrict the free flow of truthful
commercial speech. Ibanez, 114
S. Ct. at 2088-89. As these
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cases previously held, the restriction of truthful, non-misleading advertising is allowed
only if the State demonstrates
that the regulation is no more
extensive than necessary to
materially advance a substantial
state interest. Id. at 2088 (citing
CentralHudson Gas &Electric
Corp.v. PublicService Comm 'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980)). This is due to the
general theory that "disclosure
oftruthful, relevant information
is more likely to make a positive
contribution to decisionmaking
than is concealment of such information." Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2088-89 (quoting Peel v. Attorney RegistrationandDisciplinaryComm 'nofIll., 496 U.S.
91, 108 (1990)). This position
was further reinforced by the
Court's declaration that thejustification of restricting truthful
commercial speech must be
based on real and articulable
harms, rather than "mere speculation or conjecture." Ibanez,
114 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S.Ct.
1792 (1993)). The Court reasoned that the value ofcommercial speech was great enough to
impose upon State regulators
the significant costs of distinguishing between commercial
speech that is truthful and false,
helpful and misleading, and
harmless and harmful. Ibanez,
114 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing Zauder
v. Office ofDisciplinaryCounsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)).
Having established the
standard for the restriction of
truthful commercial speech, the

Court considered Petitioner's
commercial communications
that included use of the CPA
designation. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2089. Initially, the Board
asserted that although Ibanez
did hold a valid CPA license, her
use of the CPA designation
would lead the public to believe
that she was subject to the provisions of the Public Accountancy Act and to the Board itself, when she in fact did not
believe this to be the case. Id. In
her brief to the Court, however,
Ibanez withdrew her objections
to theBoard's assertion ofjurisdiction. Id. While Petitioner's
withdrawn objection essentially
made the Board's decision regarding this matter inconsequential, the Court addressed whether Ibanez's belief as to the
Board's jurisdiction was
sanctionable. Id.
The Court focused on
the Board's lack of specific evidence of noncompliance by
Ibanez as the essential missing
element in the Board's Final
Order. Id. In fact, the Court
noted that the only allegation by
the Board of any sanctionable
misconduct was the charge of
practicing public accounting in
an unlicensed firm, which it
eventually chose to drop. Id. at
2089 n.8. Additionally, the
Court stressed that Petitioner's
personal belief that she was beyond the Board's authority was
not a specific act of noncompliance and that sanctioning
Ibanez's use of the CPA designation for that sole reason violated her First Amendment right
to free speech. Id (citingBaird
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v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1, 6 (1971)). Thus, the
Court held that because Ibanez
had an active CPA license, it
was unlikely that her truthful
representation of her CPA
licensure could mislead a consumer. Id
The Court next turned
to Ibanez's disclosure of her
CFP status, which the Board
maintained was subject to the
Board's restriction because
"certified" inherently misleads
the public into assuming that the
Board, and therefore the State,
has licensed or approved the
individual with the CFP status.
In analyzing this issue, the Court
relied on its opinion, as did the
Board, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990). Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at
2089-91. In Peel, the Court
held "that an attorney's use of
the designation 'Certified Civil
Trial Specialist By the National
Board of Trial Advocacy' was
neither actually nor inherently
misleading," despite the fact that
such certification was not granted by the State. Id. at 2089-90.
In addition, Peelstated that certification by bonafide specialist
organizations (such as the Certified Financial Planner Board
of Standards) used in commercial speech, that are not actually
or inherently misleading, may
not be completelybanned. Id at
2090 (emphasis added).
Similar to the Court's
consideration ofthe CPA issue,
the Court admonished the
Board's failure to offer evidence
that distinguished the instant

case from that in Peel. Id. Because the Board did not substantiate its assertion that the
CFP designation was actually
or inherently misleading, but
rather contended only that deception could occur in hypothetical cases, the Court found
that the Board had not overcome the "constitutional presumption favoring disclosure
over concealment." Id. (quoting Peel, 496 U.S. at 111).
Relying upon the concurring opinions of Justices
Marshall and Brennan in Peel,
the Board alternatively maintained that the use of the CFP
designation was "potentially
misleading," thus allowing the
Board to prevent deception or
confusion resulting from disclosure of CFP status by employing any measures short of a
total ban. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at
2090. In response, the Court
reiterated its requirement that
the Board must demonstrate that
the dangers to the public, as a
result of the specified commercial speech "are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree." Id.
(quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
113 S. Ct. 1792(1993)). Moreover, the words "potentially
misleading," when used as the
solejustification without explanation, are not a catch-all phrase
that empower a State organization to restrict truthful commercial speech. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2090 (citing Edenfield, 113
S.Ct. 1792). Here again, the
Board offered no evidence tending to demonstrate its concern
that the CFP designation was
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"potentially misleading."
Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2090.
The Court, however, did
acknowledge that the concurring opinion of Justice Marshall
in Peel found the .use of the
term "NBTA Certified Civil
Trial Specialist" potentiallymisleading. Id. at 2091 (emphasis
added). Distinguishing the Peel
concurrence while applying its
rationale to the case at hand, the
Court noted that Peel did not
state that all specialty designations were similarly situated. Id.
The Peel court also implicitly
acknowledged that other more
commonly recognized certifying specialty organizations could
certify individuals with designations that would not be potentially misleading. Id. (emphasis added). As a result, the
Court addressed the background
of the financial planning field
along with a brief analysis of
certification requirements. Noting that the terms "Certified
Financial Planner" and "CFP"
are both "well-established, protected federal trademarks," and
that the method ofCFP licensure
is similar to that of CPA
licensure, the Court held that
restricting disclosure ofthe CFP
status in commercial speech was
violative of the First Amendment. Id.
The significance of the
Ibanez opinion lies not in the
Court's decision that the State
bears a heavy burden in justifying restrictions upon the use of
a validly held CPA designation
in commercial speech, but rather in the finding that the disclosure of the CFP designation in
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truthful commercial speech is
not actually, inherently, or potentially misleading under the
facts alleged. Because the CFP
designation is not considered
misleading in any way, under
the facts of Ibanez, State re-

Lesnick v. Hollingsworth
& Vose Co.:
ACTIONS
PURPOSELY
DIRECTED TOWARD
FOR UM STATE
REQUIRED TO
SUBJECT OUTOF-STATE
DEFENDANT TO
PERSONAL
JURISDICTION.

striction is not allowed under
the First Amendment. As noted
in the opinion, approximately
27,000 persons have qualified
for the CFP designation. Consequently, the Supreme Court's
stance on its use by individuals

and restriction by the States
becomes important since a person's credentials are often considered by consumers when
choosing a service provider -including financial planners.
- FiorelloJ.P. Vicencio Jr.

In
Lesnick
v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35
F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994), the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that
Maryland courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant unless the defendant's actions were
purposely directed toward the
forum state. In so ruling, the
court followed the long-standing Supreme Court decisions on
minimum contacts. Thus, in
order for a state to assert personaljurisdiction, the defendant
must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state and
the defendant must have reasonably anticipated being subject to suit in the forum state.
LtiWnc.('torilarcd'),

principal places of business in
New York and Massachusetts,
respectively, produced the Kent
cigarette. The filter medium
was manufacturedbyHollingsworth
in Massachusetts and shipped to
Lorillard's plants in Kentucky
and New Jersey, where the final
Kent cigarettes with the
"Micronite Filter" were manufactured. Hollingsworth provided Lorillard with an estimated 10 billion asbestos-containing filters which Lorillard distributed throughout the nation
between 1952 and 1956.
Hollingsworth was cognizant of
Lorillard's national distribution,
but Hollingsworth did not direct any of its business toward
the state of Maryland.
StanleyLesnick, aMaryland resident, regularly smoked
Kent cigarettes and died of cancer caused by years of inhaling
the cancer-causing agent "cro-

a New York corporation, and
Hollingsworth & Vose Co.
("Hollingsworth"), a Massachusetts corporation, with their
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